SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : EPD&C - AFT-RCS FMEA NO 05-6KA-2280 -2 REV:11/03/87

ASSEMBLY : PANEL R15

P/N RI :MC454-0026-2030

VEHICLE 102 103 104

P/N VENDOR: QUANTITY :2

VEHICLE 102 103 104 EFFECTIVITY: X X X

: TWO

PHASE(8): PL X LO X OO X DO X LS X

PREPARED BY:

REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A-FASS B-FAIL C-PASS APPROVED BY: APPROVED BY (NASA):

DES D

D SOVEREIGN DES

APPROVED BY (NASA)

CRIT. FUNC:

1R

3

REL QE J BEEKMAN

REL MAND CLERON (1-14-Y) RELAND

QE IN AND CLERON (1-14-Y) QE PAS

Explosed tombert taken

ITEM:

CIRCUIT BREAKER (3 AMF) - LEFT AND RIGHT AFT RCS FUEL AND OXIDIZER -- MANIFOLD 5 ISOLATION VALVE, MANUAL SWITCH GROUND DRIVER COMMAND CIRCUIT.

FUNCTION:

THE CIRCUIT BREAKER CONDUCTS LOGIC INPUTS FROM THE MANUAL SWITCH TO THE GROUND DRIVER AND PROVIDES THE CAPABILITY TO MANUALLY ISOLATE THE MANUAL SWITCH. 32V73A15CB71,72.

FAILURE MODE:

SHORT, FAILS CLOSED, INTERNALLY SHORTS

CAUSE(S):

PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION

EFFECT(S) ON:

- (A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE
- (A) LOSS OF REDUNDANCY.
- (B) NO EFFECT FIRST FAILURE. BREAKER IS NORMALLY IN THE CLOSED POSITION.
- (C, D) NO EFFECT.
- (E) FUNCTIONAL CRITICALITY EFFECT POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO VALVE OVERHEATING AND PROPELLANT DECOMPOSITION BY CONTINUOUS SOLENOID COIL POWERING LEADING TO VALVE RUPTURE AND PROPELLANT RELEASE. REQUIRES 3 OTHER FAILURES (REASON TO MOVE SWITCH, SWITCH JAM, TYPE III OPEN ON) BEFORE EFFECT IS MANIFESTED. THE FAILURE STRING COULD BE UNDETECTABLE AFTER THE FIRST FAILURE DUE TO LACK OF MEASUREMENT INDICATIONS FOR THE TYPE III AND TYPE IV HYBRID DRIVERS.

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DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:

- (A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE
- (A-D) FOR DISPOSITION AND RATIONALE REFER TO AFPENDIX D, ITEM NO. 1 CIRCUIT BREAKER.
- (B) GROUND TURNAROUND TEST
 COMPONENT CHECKED OUT EVERY FLIGHT DURING GROUND TURNAROUND. THE TESTING
 CONSISTS OF CYCLING VALVE MANUAL SWITCHES AND/OR SENDING GENERAL FURFOSE
 COMPUTER (GPC) COMMANDS TO CYCLE VALVES OR HEATERS WHILE MONITORING
 VEHICLE INSTRUMENTATION TO DETERMINE IF COMPONENTS HAVE FAILED.
- (E) OPERATIONAL USE NO ACTION - NOT DETECTABLE.